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Watching Me: The War on Crime, 
Privacy, and the State 
Kimberly D. Bailey∗ 
The war on crime exemplifies how the deprivation of privacy makes one 
vulnerable to oppressive state social control. Scholars have severely 
criticized the war on crime’s subordinating effects on poor urban people of 
color. The role that privacy deprivation plays in this subordination, 
however, has been under-theorized. This Article takes an initial step in 
addressing this gap in the literature. It argues that one important reason 
why the war on crime is so abusive is because it oppressively invades 
individuals’ privacy; poor people of color have limited opportunities in the 
creation of their life plans, participation in mainstream political discourse, 
and access to social capital in part because they have limited privacy. 
These privacy invasions also have an expressive aspect because they send 
the message that the state does not trust these individuals to engage in 
valued activities in legitimate ways; therefore, they must constantly be 
watched. As a result, the deprivation of privacy also results in serious 
dignitary harms. This Article further argues that current criminal justice 
policies cannot even be justified on utilitarian grounds. Indeed, the privacy 
invasions this Article describes contribute to counterproductive criminal 
justice policies. While this Article focuses on poor people of color, it 
cautions that they are the canary in the mine. Whites are also currently 
experiencing serious privacy invasions in the form of mass surveillance 
and DNA collection. The practices of harsh sentencing and overcharging 
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are making them even more vulnerable to further privacy invasions. The 
truth is that for all Americans, criminal justice policies are steadily 
minimizing the line between the individual and the state. 
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You busy watching me, watching me/That you’re blind baby, you 
neglect to see/The drugs coming into my community/Weapons 
coming into my community/Dirty cops in my community/And 
you keep saying that I’m free/And you keep saying that I’m 
free/And you keep saying that I’m free.1 
Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner’s 
canary: their distress is the first sign of a danger that threatens 
us all.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Gloria is a middle-aged African-American woman who lives in a 
housing project with her family. She is constantly aware of the 
presence of the police. She always carries identification and a piece of 
mail with her so that the police will not mistake her for someone who 
is trespassing when she comes and goes from her housing project. 
Although she is extroverted by nature, she also does not take the time 
to make small talk with her neighbors in the project’s courtyard 
because she wants to limit her potential exposure to the police. As it 
is, she is stopped and questioned by the police on a regular basis. Her 
husband, Charles, has made it a habit of always carrying a pay stub 
from his employer with him because when he is stopped and 
questioned by the police, they always intimate that he might be 
earning his income in illegitimate ways. 
Gloria and Charles only leave their apartment when it is necessary. 
Although their teenage son, Alex, is a good kid who stays out of 
trouble, Gloria and Charles also discourage him from spending much 
time outside of their apartment in order to protect him from potential 
police encounters. They also forbid Alex from wearing baggy clothes 
and hoodies. Alex hates being cooped up inside their apartment, and 
he resents the fact that he cannot dress in the way that he wants. 
Charles, Gloria, and Alex do not know, however, that despite their 
efforts the police already have Alex listed in a gang database. The 
police once saw Alex talking with his friend, John, whom they 
suspected of being involved in gang activity and drug trafficking. 
Thus, Alex’s association with John led them to put him in their 
database. The reason the police suspected John of being involved in 
criminal activity is because his friend, Ben, “snitched” on him in order 
to get himself out of some legal trouble. He was facing some hefty jail 
 
 1 JILL SCOTT, WATCHING ME (Hidden Beach Recordings 2000). 
 2 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002). 
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time for marijuana possession. In order to get probation, Ben provided 
false information on John. The police later learned that Ben was lying 
when they conducted a SWAT invasion of John’s home and found no 
evidence of narcotics. Despite the police’s error, Alex’s and John’s 
names are still in the gang database.3 
Popular media and the academic community have heavily criticized 
the war on crime, and particularly the war on drugs, as heavy-handed 
and destructive.4 Specifically, the critique often focuses on the 
subordinating effects that this war has had on poor urban 
communities of color.5 The role of privacy deprivation in this 
subordination, however, has been under-theorized. This Article takes 
an initial step in addressing this gap in the literature. I argue that 
because privacy makes an individual less vulnerable to oppressive 
state social control, the deprivation of privacy can be an important 
aspect of one’s subordination. 
With respect to the war on crime, I intentionally paint with a broad 
brush. Each of the tactics and privacy harms that I will describe merit 
a much fuller analysis than I will be able to provide within the scope 
of this one Article.6 By engaging in a more general analysis of the most 
salient harms these tactics cause, my goal is two-fold. First, I describe 
the breadth and pervasiveness of tactics used in the war on crime that 
affect privacy. Second, I argue that because many poor people of color 
experience some or all of these tactics simultaneously, the privacy 
 
 3 This is a fictionalized account based on actual cases and reports by poor urban 
people of color about their experiences with the criminal justice system. See generally 
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND FRISK, THE HUMAN IMPACT: THE STORIES 
BEHIND THE NUMBERS, THE EFFECTS ON OUR COMMUNITIES (July 2012), available at 
http://stopandfrisk.org/the-human-impact-report.pdf (documenting interviews with 
individuals routinely subjected to similar privacy invasions).  
 4 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 140-77 (2010); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 36-37 (2009); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
48-50 (2011); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 678-81 (1995); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of 
Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 28-33 (2012); 
Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on 
Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUS. 381, 383 (2002); Wendy 
Ruderman, Rude or Polite, City’s Officers Leave Raw Feelings in Stops, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 
2012) [hereinafter Rude or Polite], http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/nyregion/new-
york-police-leave-raw-feelings-in-stops.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 5 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 175-204; BUTLER, supra note 4, at 25-40; JEROME G. 
MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
10 (2d ed. 2011); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE 
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 6, 102-19 (2009); STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 48, 272, 286. 
 6 I plan to engage in this broader project through several articles in the future. 
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harms involved are an absolutely oppressive form of state abuse that 
leads to a harsh form of state social control.7 
To provide some background on the war on crime, Part I of this 
Article will discuss its racialized origins. In Part II, I argue that the war 
on crime exemplifies how the deprivation of privacy makes one 
vulnerable to oppressive state social control. The state engages in an 
unjustifiable privacy invasion whenever the monitoring of its citizens 
results in the abuse of its power. This abuse can come in the form of 
the prohibition of activities that society views as valuable; the creation 
of a sense of being constantly monitored by the state, which then has a 
chilling effect on these activities; or the unjustifiable aggregation of 
data on the state’s citizens. The privacy invasions that result from 
stops-and-frisks, motor stops, data aggregation through technology, 
SWAT invasions, and snitching8 at minimum discourage or prohibit 
poor people of color from freely engaging in self-determination, self-
expression, and freedom of association due to a fear of being 
monitored, judged, and even unjustifiably punished. Furthermore, the 
practices of overcharging and harsh sentencing make them vulnerable 
to even further privacy invasions. In other words, one important 
reason why the war on crime is so abusive is because it oppressively 
invades individuals’ privacy — poor people of color have limited 
opportunities in the creation of their life plans, participation in 
mainstream political discourse, and access to social capital in part 
because they have limited privacy. 
These privacy invasions also have an expressive aspect because they 
send the message that the state does not trust these individuals to 
engage in valued activities in legitimate ways; therefore, they must 
constantly be watched. The fact that these criminal justice tactics 
disproportionately affect poor people of color also sends the message 
that the state has less respect for them and values their identities and 
viewpoints less than those of wealthier and white individuals, who are 
afforded more privacy. Both of these messages result in dignitary harms. 
Part III argues that not only are these tactics problematic from a moral 
perspective, but it is also difficult to support them on utilitarian 
 
 7 For the purposes of this Article, I will not be focusing on the war on terror or 
the use of the criminal justice system to curb immigration. Although both practices 
also affect people of color, they each involve unique privacy concerns and state 
interests. For this reason, I have opted to address them separately in future articles. 
 8 The term “snitching” does not refer to law-abiding citizens or victims who 
report crimes to the police. Instead, it refers to the state practice of recruiting 
individuals, often criminals themselves, to provide information to the government in 
exchange for dropped charges, lenient sentences, money, or even drugs. See 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
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grounds. Some might argue that given the serious problem of violent 
crime in poor neighborhoods of color, these privacy invasions by the 
state are in fact justified. Evidence suggests, however, that many of the 
tactics discussed in this Article are not decreasing crime.9 Furthermore, 
the provision of more privacy by the state actually promotes more 
effective criminal justice policy because, as an expression of respect, it 
encourages compliance with the law and the type of strong informal 
networks that are characteristic of communities with low crime rates.10 
For these reasons, many of the practices discussed in this Article have 
proven to be counterproductive. In addition, although mass surveillance 
has the potential to deter crime, prevent wrongful convictions, and limit 
racial profiling and police brutality,11 a serious analysis of the privacy 
harms these practices cause is essential in determining under what 
circumstances their law enforcement value outweighs privacy concerns. 
Some of the tactics discussed in this Article are beginning to 
threaten the privacy of whites in addition to those of color, including 
data aggregation through technology. For this reason, poor people of 
color appear to be the canary in the mine;12 the truth is that all 
Americans should be concerned about the fact that these policies are 
steadily diminishing the line between the individual and the state. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WAR ON CRIME 
A. The Drumbeats of War 
The political rhetoric of law and order has racialized roots.13 
Beginning in the mid-1950s, some segregationists labeled civil rights 
activists as “law breakers” and argued that civil rights for African-
 
 9 See discussion infra Part III. 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 351-354. 
 11 See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 959, 960 (2013) [hereinafter Crime, Surveillance, and Communities]. 
 12 See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 2, at 11 (arguing that those who are racially 
marginalized are “like the miner’s canary”). “Miners often carried a canary into the 
mine . . . [because] [t]he canary’s more fragile respiratory system would cause it to 
collapse from noxious gases long before humans were affected . . . . The canary’s 
distress signaled that it was time to get out of the mine because the air was becoming 
too poisonous to breathe.” Id. 
 13 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 40; Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on 
Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 618-22 (2009). The contention that tough-on-crime 
rhetoric has racialized roots is not meant to suggest, however, that all people of color 
are against tough-on-crime policies. See Forman, supra note 4, at 36-44. Indeed, there 
are African-Americans that view tougher criminal justice policies as a form of racial 
justice. See id. at 42, 44. 
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Americans would only lead to more crime.14 U.S. Representative John 
Bell Williams once proclaimed: 
This exodus of Negroes from the South, and their influx into 
the great metropolitan centers of other areas of the Nation, has 
been accompanied by a wave of crime. . . . What has civil 
rights accomplished for these areas? . . . Segregation is the 
only answer as most Americans — not the politicians — have 
realized for hundreds of years.15 
It is true that during the 1960s, the national crime rate soared.16 
Increased crime, combined with the riots and uprisings that occurred 
in the summer of 1964 and subsequent to the assassination of Martin 
Luther King Jr. in 1968,17 allowed politicians to take advantage of the 
fears, anxieties, and resentments of poor and working-class white 
Americans.18 Barry Goldwater laid the foundation for the “get tough 
on crime” movement during his 1964 presidential campaign when he 
argued that continued leadership under President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
Administration would lead to “mobs in the street.”19 
By 1968, 81% of respondents to the Gallup Poll agreed with the 
statement that “law and order has broken down in the country”;20 the 
majority blamed “Negroes who start riots” and “Communists.”21 That 
 
 14 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 41-42.  
 15 Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16 “Reported street crime quadrupled in the twelve years from 1959 to 1971. 
Homicide rates doubled between 1963 and 1974, and robbery rates tripled.” Forman, 
supra note 4, at 35. But see ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 41 (noting that while crimes 
rates did increase during this period, the accuracy of the rates reported by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation has been questioned). 
 17 The Kerner Commission determined that one of the major causes of this rioting 
was police harassment and brutality. See I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth 
Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
33 (2010) [hereinafter Rethinking the Fourth Amendment]. 
 18 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 42-45. It should be noted that African-
Americans embraced tougher criminal justice policies, particularly in New York, 
because increased crime in their neighborhoods alarmed them. See VANESSA BARKER, 
THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY 
AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 150-52 (2009). However, these activists tended not to 
support harsh penalties against low-level dealers and addicts. See id. at 151. 
 19 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 41. 
 20 See id. at 45. 
 21 See id. While the civil rights movement was a chief cause of anxiety during this 
period, “the economy, protests against the Vietnam war, political mobilization on 
college campuses, the counter-culture movement generally, or a sense of social crisis 
engendered for many by the demands for women’s and gay rights” also created an 
anxiety about “social disorganization.” See Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: 
  
1546 University of California, Davis [Vol. 47:1539 
same year, Richard Nixon and George Wallace made “law and order” a 
central theme of their presidential campaigns and they garnered 57% 
of the vote.22 They specifically targeted civil rights activists in their 
“law and order” campaign. After viewing one of his political ads that 
made this targeting explicit, Nixon reportedly crowed that the ad “hits 
it right on the nose. It’s all about those damn Negro-Puerto Rican 
groups out there.”23 
Claiming that illegal drugs were “public enemy number one,” Nixon 
then declared a rhetorical “war on drugs” during his presidency that 
did not propose any real changes in drug policy.24 President Reagan 
later chimed in on this rhetoric, but he waged a war with more heft.25 
When Reagan officially announced his war on drugs in October 1982, 
less than 2% of the American public actually viewed drugs as the most 
important issue facing the nation.26 Indeed, drug crimes were actually 
declining in the nation at this point.27 A few years after his declaration, 
however, Reagan’s administration was able to generate public support 
for his effort due to the crack phenomenon. Deindustrialization and 
globalization had devastated the job market for poor urban dwellers 
with limited skills and education during the 1970s.28 When crack 
arrived on urban streets around 1985, the current harsh economic 
conditions made the sale of the drug an attractive way to make 
money.29 As drug markets struggled to stabilize and anger due to the 
high unemployment rate festered, violence spiked in the inner cities.30 
The Reagan administration engaged in a media blitz, which 
 
Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 
1032 (2010).  
 22 ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 46.  
 23 PHILIP A. KINKER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 292 (1999). Nixon also declared a war on the 
welfare state: “[T]he ‘solution to the crime problem is not the quadrupling of funds for 
any governmental war on poverty but more convictions.’” See KATHERINE BECKETT, 
MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 38 (1997).  
 24 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 47. 
 25 See id. at 49. 
 26 See id. But see Nunn, supra note 4, at 389 (“Reagan’s declaration of war tapped 
into a growing public sentiment against illegal drug use. Many citizens viewed drugs 
as a menace and many of these same citizens were readily supportive of Reagan’s 
proposals to address the drug problem.”). 
 27 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 7; see also Nunn, supra note 4, at 389. 
 28 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 49-50; Nunn, supra note 4, at 421. 
 29 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 50; see also Nunn, supra note 4, at 421. 
Interestingly, although African-Americans constituted more than 80% of crack 
defendants, they were only a minority of regular users. See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 184. 
 30 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 50-51. 
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sensationalized the emergence of crack cocaine in poor, urban 
neighborhoods.31 These efforts worked. By 1986, Newsweek 
proclaimed that crack was the biggest story since Vietnam/Watergate; 
Time named it the issue of the year.32 Furthermore, although whites 
and African-Americans use illegal drugs at comparable rates,33 the 
faces of the drug problem in the United States were the black “crack 
whore,” the black “crack baby,” and the black “gangbanger.”34 Federal 
budgets for federal law enforcement agencies soared during the 
1980s.35 In contrast, budgets for agencies responsible for drug 
prevention, treatment, and education plummeted.36 
President George H.W. Bush continued the campaign and declared 
that drug use was “the most pressing problem facing the nation.”37 By 
1990, the New York Times/CBS News Poll reported that the number of 
those who thought that drugs were the most significant problem in the 
United States had increased to 64% of poll respondents.38 
Democrats tried to convince the American public that they could be 
even tougher on crime than Republicans.39 In 1965, President Johnson 
delivered his first presidential address on crime and sent a legislative 
anticrime agenda to Congress.40 While a presidential candidate, Bill 
 
 31 See id. at 49. 
 32 See id. at 51; Richard M. Smith, The Plague Among Us, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 
1986, at 15. 
 33 See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 102; STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 272. Studies show 
that white professionals may be the most likely of any group to use illegal drugs in 
their lifetime. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 192. 
 34 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 51; see also Nunn, supra note 4, at 390 (arguing 
that it was easy to construct African-Americans, Latinos, and other people of color as 
the enemy of the war on drugs given the fact that the majority of white Americans 
always viewed these individuals as the source of vice and crime). 
 35 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 49. Between 1980 and 1984, antidrug funding 
increased from $8 million to $95 million for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See 
id. Between 1981 and 1991, antidrug allocations increased from $33 million to $1,042 
million for the Department of Defense and from $38 million to $181 million for the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations. See id. During that same period, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency’s spending grew from $86 million to $1,026 million. See id. 
 36 Between 1981 and 1984, the budget for the National Institute for Drug Abuse 
decreased from $274 million to $57 million. See id. Funds allocated to the Department 
of Education for antidrug efforts decreased from $14 million to $3 million. See id. 
 37 BECKETT, supra note 23, at 44. 
 38 ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 54 (citing New York Times/CBS News Poll from 
August of 1990). 
 39 See id. at 54-55. 
 40 See LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Special Message to the Congress on Law Enforcement and 
the Administration of Justice, in I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
LYNDON B. JOHNSON: CONTAINING THE PUBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF 
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Clinton attended the execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally 
impaired African-American, and stated afterward, “I can be nicked a 
lot, but no one can say I’m soft on crime.”41 Once elected, he endorsed 
and signed a bill that imposed harsher sentencing42 and authorized 
millions of dollars for state prison grants and the expansion of state 
and local police forces.43 The Justice Policy Institute later observed 
that “the Clinton Administration’s ‘tough on crime’ policies resulted in 
the largest increases in federal and state prison inmates of any 
president in American history.”44 Thus, both sides of the political aisle 
have taken on an intense ferocity when it comes to their rhetoric and 
actions regarding crime, and particularly illegal drugs.45 
B. It’s a Numbers Game 
While racial politics is one reason why the rhetoric regarding the 
war on drugs has focused on African-Americans and Latinos, there is 
also a more practical explanation why the war on the ground has 
focused on these communities: the war on drugs is a numbers game;46 
poor urban neighborhoods are the easiest places to increase arrest 
numbers.47 The sale of drugs tends to be the most visible in poor 
urban neighborhoods with low-level dealers on street corners.48 Poor 
African-Americans and Latinos tend to be concentrated in these 
 
THE PRESIDENT 1965, at 263-71 (1966); see also López, supra note 21, at 1033. 
 41 Michael Kramer, Frying Them Isn’t the Answer, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 32; see 
also López, supra note 21, at 1038 (arguing that Clinton’s “aggressive engagements 
with crime and welfare during the 1990’s” was a way to pander to “white voters 
through coded racial appeals”). 
 42 Specifically, the bill created dozens of new federal capital offenses and imposed 
mandatory life sentences for some three-time offenders. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, 
at 55. 
 43 See id. 
 44 David Guard, Clinton Crime Agenda Shortsighted; May Hurt Poor and Minorities, 
Advocates Say, STOP DRUG WAR.ORG (Apr. 15, 2008, 1:40 PM), http://stopthedrugwar. 
org/trenches/2008/apr/15/clinton_crime_agenda_shortsighte. 
 45 See Nunn, supra note 4, at 390 (“For each anti-drug measure that passed, it 
became necessary to further escalate the war so that no one, Democrat or Republican, 
executive or legislative branch, could be called soft on this critical issue.”); see also 
Gruber, supra note 13, at 618 (“[B]eing tough on crime has become a sure-win 
platform on both sides of the political aisle.”). For a discussion about why the election 
of Barack Obama as the first African-American president probably will not end the 
mass incarceration of African-Americans and Latinos, see generally López, supra note 
21, at 1068-73. 
 46 See BUTLER, supra note 4, at 93-94. 
 47 See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 54; see also BUTLER, supra note 4, at 93-94. 
 48 See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 54. 
  
2014] Watching Me 1549 
neighborhoods;49 poor whites tend to be geographically dispersed.50 In 
addition, abandoned, dilapidated buildings and houses in blighted 
areas are havens for drug sales and drug users.51 In contrast, white 
suburban drug use and sales can be more hidden.52 
It is important to note that prior to the mid-1980s, the criminal 
justice system was marginal to communities of color.53 While poor, 
uneducated men of color have always had high and disproportionate 
rates of incarceration, it was not until the end of the last century that 
the exponential rate of incarceration made the penal system a 
“dominant presence” in disadvantaged neighborhoods.54 
Beginning with President Reagan’s term in office, the federal 
government has offered millions of dollars to state and local agencies 
willing to fight drug crimes.55 Many of the prolific specialized 
narcotics task forces that exist throughout the country today are the 
result of the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law 
Enforcement Assistance Program.56 In order to convince the federal 
government that they are putting the grant money to good use, 
however, these task forces are under extreme pressure to keep their 
arrest numbers up.57 Otherwise, the federal government will not renew 
their grant money.58 
Special forfeiture provisions also incentivize high arrest numbers 
because the cash and assets that state and local law enforcement 
agencies seize upon arrest become the property of those agencies 
under revenue-sharing agreements with the federal government.59 
 
 49 See id.; George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty”: The 
Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing 
Rights, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1746, 1806 (2012). 
 50 See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 54. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 183.  
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. at 72. 
 56 Id. The program is authorized by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 as amended 
in 1988. See Pub. L. No. 100-600, 102 Stat. 4329 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3750-55 (2012)). 
 57 See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden 
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 82 (1998); see also United States v. Reese, 2 
F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing the pressures experienced by members of an 
Oakland Housing Authority police task force to maintain strong drug arrest numbers). 
 58 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 57, at 82. 
 59 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 77; see also 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2) (2012); 19 
U.S.C. § 1616a(c) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2012). For discussions about 
how federal funding of the war on drugs and asset forfeiture provisions breed 
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Criminal charges do not even have to be brought against the owners of 
this property in order for agencies to keep it.60 Instead, the 
government only has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the property was involved in a commission of a drug crime.61 The 
owner of the property then has the burden to prove that she “did not 
know of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture” or that she did “all 
that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to 
terminate such use of the property.”62 Counsel is appointed only for 
those individuals who have been formally charged with a crime,63 but 
the vast majority of forfeiture cases involve individuals who have not 
been charged with anything.64 Without an appointed attorney, many 
choose not to challenge their forfeitures because the cost of an 
attorney is often more than what their property is worth.65 
Furthermore, individuals might fear that if they challenge a forfeiture 
of their property, they will risk the chance that the government will 
decide to file formal criminal charges in retaliation.66 For these 
reasons, up to 90% of forfeiture cases are not challenged in some 
jurisdictions.67 
Given the financial stakes involved, drug offenders in poor, inner 
city communities arguably are the most logical targets of the war on 
drugs. If federal grant money incentivizes high arrest rates, then the 
police will focus on communities where they can increase their 
numbers with the lowest amount of effort.68 Moreover, special 
forfeiture provisions also incentivize high arrest rates and an intense 
focus on those who cannot afford to challenge the seizure of their 
assets. 
 
corruption in police departments, see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 80-81; Ted 
Conover, A Snitch’s Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/07/01/magazine/alex-white-professional-snitch.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print. 
 60 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 81. Women in relationships with men suspected 
of drug crimes are the most frequent claimants in forfeiture proceedings. See id. 
 61 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2012). 
 62 Id. § 983(d)(2)(A). 
 63 See id. § 983 (b)(1)(A). 
 64 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 81. 
 65 See id. at 81-82. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Id. at 82. 
 68 See Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities 
in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 122 (2006) [hereinafter Race, Drugs, 
and Policing] (finding “some evidence that law enforcement’s focus on outdoor drug 
venues does contribute to racial disparity in drug arrests”). 
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C. Racial Stereotypes 
The higher visibility of drug sales in poor, urban neighborhoods is 
probably not the only reason that poor African-Americans and Latinos 
have been the focus of the war on drugs. Scholars have noted that 
“there has always been a racial dimension to American drug policy.”69 
Anxiety about Chinese immigrants in the mid-1870s led to the first 
national campaign against narcotics, specifically opium.70 The 
perceived threat of African-Americans after Reconstruction led to the 
nation’s first drug criminalization statute, which made cocaine 
illegal.71 During the 1920s, marijuana and Mexican-Americans, who 
were viewed as a labor threat, became the focus of laws in the western 
states.72 During all of these campaigns, racist stereotypes justified the 
focus on people of color.73 
Similarly, empirical research suggests that the stereotypes regarding 
crack dealers, crack babies, and crack whores not only affect the 
public perception of the drug problem, but they also affect the 
discretionary decisions of law enforcement.74 One study found that the 
Seattle Police Department ignored reports of outdoor activity in 
predominately white areas of Seattle, and with respect to racially 
mixed open-air markets, African-American dealers were far more 
likely to be arrested than whites.75 The police also devoted their 
resources to open-air markets in the precinct that was the least likely 
 
 69 See Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Possession Arrests, and the Question of 
Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 424 (2005) [hereinafter Drug Use]; 
Nunn, supra note 4, at 412. 
 70 See Nunn, supra note 4, at 413.  
 71 See id. at 415-16.  
 72 See id. at 416-17. 
 73 Because a significant number of Chinese-Americans used opium, the focus on 
opium created a justification to harass them. See id. at 413-14. Furthermore, “[i]t was 
widely believe[d] that Chinese opium dens would entrap virtuous white women who 
would then be available to have sex with Asian men.” Id. at 414. After the 
Reconstruction, whites believed that cocaine fortified African-Americans for criminal 
activities. See id. at 415. Whites were particularly fearful that African-Americans 
would forget their place, become violent, and rape white women. See id. at 415-16. 
During the 1920s, whites believed that marijuana “encouraged Chicanos to commit 
crimes and become more violent and dangerous.” Id. at 417. 
 74 See Beckett et al., Drug Use, supra note 69, at 436 (concluding that the Seattle 
Police Department’s decision to focus on crack and outdoor markets in the downtown 
area was based on a “racialized conception of ‘the drug problem’”); see also Nunn, 
supra note 4, at 382 (“In the minds of the criminal justice system’s managers, planners 
and workers, drugs are frequently associated with African American citizens and their 
communities.”). 
 75 See Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 68, at 129-30. 
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to be identified by citizen complaints as having suspected drug 
activity.76 In other words, they were not focusing on these open-air 
markets because citizens were asking them to focus on these markets. 
Indeed, Seattle residents were far more likely to report suspected drug 
activity indoors and not in open-air markets,77 but just as was the case 
with open-air arrests, African-American dealers were overrepresented 
in indoor sale arrests.78 Most importantly, the police department 
focused on crack, which is more likely sold by African-Americans, 
even though local hospital records indicated that more overdose 
deaths were caused by heroin, which is predominately injected by 
whites,79 than by crack and powder cocaine combined.80 The authors 
ultimately concluded that law enforcement’s focus on crack was an 
important cause for the disproportionate rate of African-Americans 
arrested for drug delivery.81 They also concluded that the focus on 
crack was the primary cause of racial disparity in drug possession 
arrests in Seattle.82 Specifically, law enforcement focused on African-
American and Latino users.83 Regardless of whether it is conscious or 
subconscious,84 just as it has in the past, race and racial stereotypes 
appear to play a role in current drug and criminal justice policy. 
II. THE WAR ON CRIME AND PRIVACY 
Several scholars have documented how the war on crime has had 
subordinating effects on poor people of color.85 In this Part, I will 
 
 76 See id. at 126. 
 77 See id. 
 78 Id. at 122. 
 79 See Beckett et al., Drug Use, supra note 69, at 425, 434. 
 80 See id. at 434. 
 81 Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 68, at 119. 
 82 Beckett et al., Drug Use, supra note 69, at 436. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 12-15 (arguing that racial indifference, rather 
than racial hostility or overt bigotry, has led to a criminal justice system that has 
replaced Jim Crow as the American racial caste system); Nunn, supra note 4, at 440-
41, 445 (arguing that the criminal justice system is the foundation for racist attitudes 
and behaviors and that African-Americans and other people of color serve as a “pool 
of surplus criminality” in American society in that they are a criminal class ever ready 
to be blamed during times of national crisis); Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When 
Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 95-98 (2001) (arguing that 
“hyper-incarceration” has replaced the ghetto as an institution of social control over 
under-skilled African-American men). 
 85 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 20-57 (defining the current criminal 
justice system as the “new Jim Crow”); William H. Buckman & John Lamberth, 
Challenging Racial Profiles: Attacking Jim Crow on the Interstate, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
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discuss some of the most prevalent tactics used in the war on crime 
and argue that the fact that these tactics actually deprive individuals of 
privacy is an important, and often overlooked, aspect of this 
subordination. In fact, the war on crime exemplifies how the 
deprivation of privacy makes one vulnerable to oppressive state social 
control. The constant monitoring of poor people of color by the state 
at minimum has a chilling effect on their willingness to engage in self-
determination, self-expression, and freedom of association. In 
contrast, privacy enhances an individual’s ability to engage freely in 
these activities that society views as valuable86 in part because they 
provide a check against overly oppressive social control. The state’s 
provision of individual privacy also has an expressive aspect in that it 
is a demonstration of respect; when the state provides privacy, it sends 
the implicit message that the individual is “worthy” of and can be 
trusted with engaging in essential traits of personhood.87 
A. What Is Privacy? 
The concept of privacy is multi-faceted and covers a wide variety of 
contexts. There is the physical aspect of privacy, which concerns 
limiting physical invasions on a person or her property.88 There is the 
emotional aspect of privacy, which concerns protecting the integrity of 
intimate relationships.89 There is also the personal aspect of privacy, 
 
RTS. L. REV. 387, 387-88 (2001); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 
63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 723 (2000). 
 86 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.2 (1967) (noting that privacy is 
foundational to many constitutional rights because “[v]irtually every governmental 
action interferes with personal privacy to some degree”); see also Daniel J. Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088-93 (2002) [hereinafter 
Conceptualizing Privacy] (defining privacy as a “general term that refers to the 
practices we want to protect and to the protections against disruptions to these 
practices”). 
 87 According to Anita Allen, “[t]o be a person in the moral sense is to possess 
traits in virtue of which one is entitled to a high standard of treatment and to be held 
to a high standard of conduct.” ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN 
A FREE SOCIETY 43 (1988). According to Anglo-American ethicists in the Kantian 
tradition, “[s]elf consciousness, free-will, rationality, moral agency, and the ability to 
form life plans are essential traits of personhood.” Id. Privacy creates, sustains, and 
enhances personhood because it provides individuals with the space to develop these 
traits. See id. at 44. 
 88 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures 
of “persons, houses, papers, and effects”). 
 89 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (determining 
that the marital relationship is “within the zone of privacy created by several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees”). 
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which concerns autonomy in decision-making.90 All of these aspects 
share “family resemblances” to one another, yet they all also involve 
distinct activities and harms.91 Furthermore, my description of these 
three particular aspects of privacy is incomplete. An attempt to 
provide a universal definition that covers all aspects of privacy would 
prove futile because the activities and potential harms at stake depend 
on the context surrounding a specific privacy invasion.92 
In the criminal justice context, the state engages in an unjustifiable 
privacy invasion whenever the monitoring of its citizens results in the 
abuse of its power. This abuse can come in the form of the prohibition 
of activities that society views as valuable; the creation of a sense of 
being constantly monitored by the state, which then has a chilling 
effect on these activities; or the unjustifiable aggregation of data on the 
state’s citizens. These abuses result in serious dignitary harms because 
of the level of suspicion and distrust they thrust upon the individual. 
According to Anglo-American ethicists in the Kantian tradition, 
“[s]elf consciousness, free-will, rationality, moral agency, and the 
ability to form life plans are essential traits of personhood.”93 Privacy 
creates, sustains, and enhances personhood because it provides 
individuals with the space to develop these traits94 without the fear of 
being monitored, judged, and sometimes even unjustifiably punished. 
The war on crime creates such an oppressive feeling of being watched 
by the state, that it at minimum has a chilling effect on poor people of 
color’s self-determination, self-expression, and freedom of association. 
Self-determination enables an individual to create the life that one 
wants to create. Self-expression and freedom of association allow for 
the free exchange of ideas and experimentation with one’s identity, 
which are both important for self-development. They also make it 
easier for one’s ideas and cultural identity to become part of 
mainstream political discourse. In addition, freedom of association, 
particularly with a diverse group of people, increases a poor person of 
color’s social capital and chances for upward mobility.95 
 
 90 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending the right to privacy 
to the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy). 
 91 See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 86, at 1096-99. 
 92 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480-81 
(2006); Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 86, at 1088-93. 
 93 ALLEN, supra note 87, at 43. 
 94 See id. at 44. 
 95 See Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 17, at 23 (arguing that 
racial segregation limits access to the types of informal social networks that increase 
the likelihood of upward mobility). 
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Because privacy is the foundation for freedoms that enable the 
creation of one’s identity and life plans, the more privacy one has, the 
less vulnerable he is to oppressive state social control.96 For this 
reason, the level of privacy granted by the state has historically tracked 
the level of one’s political power and status.97 Wealthy, white men 
historically have had the greatest amount of privacy; women, the poor, 
and people of color have had the least amount of privacy, and, 
therefore, they have been vulnerable to more severe policies of state 
social control.98 For example, there was a time when women had to 
adhere to certain standards of sexual and reproductive conduct in 
order to be entitled to welfare benefits.99 Eligibility for Aid to 
Dependent Children was based on “suitable-home or ‘man-in-the-
house’ rules.”100 
Scholars have documented the fact that the poor and people of color 
continue to have the least amount of privacy in our society and, 
therefore, they are still the most vulnerable to more extreme state 
social control policies.101 Some argue that welfare is still a means of 
regulating the sexual behavior of many poor, single women.102 Indeed, 
many women currently must participate in mandatory paternity 
proceedings in order to be entitled to benefits, and many jurisdictions 
 
 96 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989). 
 97 See Kimberly D. Bailey, It’s Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1777, 1803-04 (2012); Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: 
Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 177-78 (2002). 
 98 See sources cited supra note 97. 
 99 See Dorothy Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions 
and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 941-42 (1995) [hereinafter Unconstitutional 
Conditions].  
 100 See id. 
 101 See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 191 
(1995); Annette Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 683, 770 (2001); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 118-34 (2011); Dorothy Roberts, The Dialectic of Privacy 
and Punishment in the Gendered Regulation of Parenting, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 191, 194 
(2009); Roberts, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 99, at 941; Dorothy Roberts, 
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of 
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1469-70 (1991); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual 
Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 121, 125 (2002). 
 102 See Janet Simmonds, Coercion in California: Eugenics Reconstituted in Welfare 
Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive Capacity, and Terms of Probation, 17 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 276-81 (2006) (arguing that family cap programs that limit the 
receipt of welfare benefits for certain children in several states is a type of social 
control that infringes on women’s reproductive rights). 
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impose family caps, which limit cash benefit increases for any children 
conceived while the mother is receiving welfare benefits.103 Recipients 
of state funded prenatal care often have to endure highly embarrassing 
and intrusive questions about their parenting history, criminal history, 
immigration status, contraceptive use, and finances, which middle- 
and upper-class women simply do not have to endure.104 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has held that welfare recipients are not entitled to 
Fourth Amendment rights when it comes to searches in their 
homes.105 Social workers can stop by and search a recipient’s home 
and interview her with no warning or warrant. As will be discussed 
more fully below, the privacy invasions that result from current 
criminal justice policies also contribute to greater social control of 
poor people of color because of the chilling effects they have on self-
determination, freedom of association, and freedom of expression. 
In addition to making poor people of color more vulnerable to 
oppressive state social control, the war on crime has also created 
serious dignitary harms. When the state curtails privacy, it sends a 
powerful message: an individual cannot be trusted to use his privacy 
in legitimate ways.106 For example, parents tend to give their children 
less privacy because they do not yet trust that the children have the 
maturity and wisdom not to make choices that could potentially harm 
themselves or others. Likewise, one reason we limit the privacy of 
prisoners is because their past acts suggest that we cannot trust them 
not to engage in criminal and potentially dangerous activities, at least 
for a set period of time. The lack of trust expressed by the state 
through the war on crime, therefore, at best resembles a form of 
paternalism; at worst, it resembles a form de facto criminalization of 
individuals simply because they are poor and of color.107 These 
individuals logically conclude that the state does not respect them nor 
 
 103 See id.; Smith, supra note 101, at 123, 174. 
 104 Bridges, supra note 101, at 118-34. 
 105 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971). 
 106 Cf. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust 
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1784 (1994) (“A 
government-citizen metaphor in the context of the Fourth Amendment is consistent 
with the Court’s recognition in cases such as Brown and Loving that rights are not 
simply enclaves of protection from government interference but also affect the 
citizen’s view of his or her role in society.”). 
 107 One man interviewed by the Center for Constitutional Rights actually described 
the militarization of his neighborhood by the police as an “outside prison.” CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 19. 
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does it view their identities and viewpoints as equal to those of white 
and wealthier citizens.108 
B. The War on Crime’s Impact on Individual Privacy 
1. Stops-and-Frisks and Motor Stops 
The myopic focus of the war on drugs on arrest and conviction 
rates, combined with the racialized view of illegal drug use, creates an 
environment where police officers feel free to subject poor urban 
African-Americans and Latinos to intrusive stops-and-frisks on a daily 
basis.109 In 2011, 84% of stops-and-frisks conducted in New York were 
on African-Americans and Latinos.110 Eighty-eight percent of these 
stops did not result in an arrest or a summons being given.111 
Contraband was found in only 2% of these stops.112 In other words, 
although the vast majority of residents of poor urban neighborhoods 
are law-abiding citizens, many of them still have to tolerate these 
intrusions.113 Indeed, particularly for young, African-American and 
Latino males, they are a regular part of life.114 For example, between 
January 2006 and March 2010, the police stopped 52,000 individuals 
in an eight-block minority area in Brooklyn.115 This amounted to an 
average of one stop per resident per year.116 The average increased to 
five stops per person for males fifteen to thirty-four years of age.117 
Some of those who have been stopped by the New York Police 
Department describe a hornet-like invasion where they are barraged 
with questions such as “where’s the weed?” and “where’s the guns?”118 
These exchanges are sometimes laced with profanity, racial epithets, 
 
 108 See id. at 11, 14; see also Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 
17, at 47-48.  
 109 See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 3. 
 110 In 2010, Blacks made up 23% of New York City’s population; Latinos made up 
29% of the population. See id. at 27 n.2. 
 111 Id. at 27 n.3. 
 112 Id. at 27 n.4. 
 113 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 69.  
 114 CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17-22. 
 115 Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
2010, at A1. Approximately 14,000 residents lived in this area. Id. 
 116 Less than 1% of the stops resulted in arrest. Only twenty-five firearms were 
recovered during these stops. Id. 
 117 Id.  
 118 Ruderman, Rude or Polite, supra note 4. 
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and name-calling like “immigrant,” “old man,” or “bro.”119 Other 
exchanges are more polite where the police officer asks whether they 
can talk with the individual; asks him a series of questions such as 
what he is doing, where he lives, and whether he has anything on him; 
and then lets the individual go.120 In either type of exchange, the 
subjects of these stops often report “feeling intruded upon and 
humiliated.”121 A college student from Brooklyn describes, “‘They talk 
to you like you’re ignorant, like you’re an animal.’”122 Another man 
from Queens describes feeling “belittled,” even though he once 
experienced a more polite exchange.123 Individuals often feel shame 
after these interactions and fear that others who witness the stop-and-
frisk will assume that they are criminals.124 Even young children are 
not immune from this practice. One New Yorker reporters, 
There’s a junior high school [where] almost all the kids are 
either of Arabic [sic] descent or Latino. There [were] days 
when you’d see all these little kids lined up, with their legs 
spread, holding [onto] the wall, and the cops are going 
through their pockets and stuff. It’s just like a terrible, 
disgusting, horrible thing to see.125 
Furthermore, police often engage in abusive and inappropriate 
behaviors via the stop-and-frisk including forcibly stripping 
individuals down to their underclothing in public, “inappropriate 
touching, physical violence and threats, extortion of sex, sexual 
harassment and other humiliating and degrading treatment.”126 
Objecting to inappropriate touching can lead to a charge of resisting 
arrest.127 
What is most striking about this practice is that residents of 
particular communities have had to modify their everyday activities in 
order to lessen the risk associated with police encounters.128 New 
Yorkers of color describe refraining from wearing stereotypical 
“ethnic” clothing and hair styles to make themselves less likely to be 
 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 6. 
 125 Id. at 13. 
 126 Id. at 5. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See id. at 17. 
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accosted by the police.129 They also describe taking public 
transportation and avoiding walking altogether to avoid encounters 
with law enforcement on the street.130 Others describe how young 
people have to stay indoors and cannot play outside.131 Adults feel like 
they cannot sit on the porch or go to the store or interact with their 
neighbors.132 
The police have particularly focused on public housing sites for 
heightened surveillance,133 but the city of New York also has a special 
program, Operation Clean Halls, which involves private buildings.134 
Under this program, owners of private buildings sign contracts with the 
New York Police Department, which allows the police to patrol these 
buildings.135 African-Americans and Latinos are disproportionately 
stopped by police as part of this program.136 
In order to avoid the accusation of trespassing, many New Yorkers 
report always carrying identification or a piece of mail verifying that 
they live in a particular building.137 Some report that residents of a 
building may even have to produce a lease in order to avoid arrest.138 
For many, they daily must endure police inquiries of, “Do you live 
here?”139 New Yorkers report that they also carry pay stubs to prove 
that they have a legitimate source of income.140 
In Chicago, police cars patrol public housing projects and when 
they stop, every young African-American man in the area 
automatically places his hands against the car and spreads his legs to 
be searched.141 This automatic reflex to “assume the position” happens 
 
 129 Id. at 7. One woman laments, “It got to the point where I have agreed to myself 
not to get any ethnic hairdos for a while . . . because I have been harassed by the 
police while wearing hair like in dreadlocks or cornrows.” Id. at 28 n.34. 
 130 Id. at 18. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 19; see Rivera et al., supra note 115, at A1 (noting that a broken lock on a 
housing project building can lead to anyone who enters that building being stopped as 
a potential trespasser).  
 134 See Colleen Long, NYPD Operation Clean Halls Challenged in Court; Program 
Allows Police Inside Private Buildings, HUFF. POST (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/11/nypd-operation-clean-halls_n_2852097.html. 
 135 See id. 
 136 In 2012, 55% of those stopped were black, 32% were Hispanic, and 10% were 
white. Id. 
 137 CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17. 
 138 Id. at 19. 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id. at 17. 
 141 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 122-23. 
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in poor communities of color across the nation,142 and it underscores 
how constant police presence and surveillance have become woven 
into the everyday fabric of poor, urban life. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that residents in these communities describe this constant 
presence as a type of “military occupation”143 or “outside prison.”144 
A variation of the stop-and-frisk is the “stop-and-sniff.” New York 
police officers will stop individuals drinking from cups in public.145 
They then ask to sniff the contents of the individual’s cup to see if it 
contains alcohol.146 If it smells like alcohol, they are issued a summons 
for public drinking.147 The penalty for the offense is small at twenty-
five dollars per ticket, but the real purpose for these stops is to have an 
excuse to check to see if an individual has any outstanding warrants.148 
As is the case with stop-and-frisk practices, residents are angry and 
resentful when police officers demand to sniff the contents of their 
cups.149 Furthermore, one judge found that 85% of the summonses 
that were issued during one month in Brooklyn were to African-
Americans and Latinos.150 
Just as is the case with stops-and-frisks, motor vehicle stops are a 
numbers game.151 As a result, tens of thousands of innocent 
individuals are pulled over every year as part of the war on drugs.152 
Unfortunately, a disproportionate number of these individuals are 
African-American and Latino.153 Indeed, many are familiar with the 
terms “driving while black” or “driving while brown,” which refer to 
the disproportionate effects of traffic stops on African-Americans and 
Latinos.154 Some New Yorkers report that they avoid driving altogether 
 
 142 See id. at 122. 
 143 Id. at 122-23; CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 19. 
 144 CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 19. 
 145 Joseph Goldstein, Sniff Test Does Not Prove Public Drinking, a Judge Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A32 [hereinafter Sniff Test]. 
 146 See id.; see also Rivera et al., supra note 115, at A1 (describing an incident where 
twenty police officers surrounded a man because he refused to let an officer smell the 
contents of his orange juice container). 
 147 See Goldstein, Sniff Test, supra note 145, at A32. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See People v. Figueroa, 948 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
 151 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 70 (quoting a California police officer as 
confirming, “You’ve got to kiss a lot of frogs before you find a prince”). 
 152 See id. 
 153 See id. 
 154 See Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 17, at 16-17; Nunn, 
supra note 4, at 401. 
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and opt for public transportation in order to avoid these 
confrontations.155 
The current state of Fourth Amendment law legitimates these stops. 
Under Terry v. Ohio, a police officer may stop a person if he has 
reasonable suspicion that a crime is afoot.156 The Supreme Court did 
not take great pains to define “reasonable suspicion” other than to 
state that it has to be something more than just a “hunch.”157 A police 
officer has to be able to articulate specific reasonable inferences drawn 
“from the facts in light of his experience.”158 Once a police officer has 
stopped an individual under reasonable suspicion, he also may 
conduct a frisk if he reasonably believes that the person may have a 
weapon that could potentially harm the officer.159 The Court’s 
rationale behind Terry was to balance law enforcement’s interest in 
investigating and preventing potential crimes with an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment right to not be subject to unreasonable searches 
and seizures.160 Its holding also was intended to minimize the 
potential safety risks police officers face during the pursuit of their 
duties.161 Although Terry provides law enforcement with a great deal 
of discretion, there are still cases where the police abuse or outright 
violate it.162 Moreover, a police officer does not even need to rely upon 
Terry if an individual consents to answer his questions or to be 
searched.163 Most individuals do not feel free not to give such consent, 
especially if they are poor or of color.164 
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With respect to traffic stops, the Supreme Court has approved the 
use of these stops as a pretext for drug investigations; as long as a 
motorist has actually violated a traffic law, the police may stop him, 
even if their actual motivation is to search him for drugs.165 Indeed, 
under the federal program Operation Pipeline, local and state agencies 
are trained on how to use a minor traffic violation as a pretext for drug 
searches.166 Once a traffic stop is made, an officer may ask the motorist 
to consent to a search of his vehicle.167 In some cases, a person’s car is 
literally torn apart.168 In most cases, a motorist will feel that he has no 
choice but to consent to this type of search;169 the Supreme Court has 
refused to require the police to inform motorists of their right not to 
consent.170 Operation Pipeline, in fact, trains officers on how to get 
consent from reluctant motorists.171 If a motorist does refuse to 
consent, the police may also opt to bring a drug-sniffing dog to the 
scene. Under these circumstances, the police do not even need the 
motorist’s permission to use the dog because a dog sniff of one’s car in 
a public area is not considered a “search,” and it therefore does not 
trigger Fourth Amendment protection.172 
It is important to stress just how intrusive stops-and-frisks and 
motor stops are; they are more than just minor annoyances. Many 
individuals, particularly young men of color, must endure these stops 
monthly, weekly, and sometimes even daily.173 The intensity and 
frequency of these stops makes these individuals feel as if they are 
constantly being watched by the state. As a result, some inner-city 
residents of New York have reported that they limit the amount of 
time that they spend on the street and that they go outside only when 
necessary in order to mitigate constant monitoring by the police and 
to maintain some sense of anonymity from the state.174 This limitation 
on their mobility necessarily undermines their ability to create the 
types of lives that they want to create through self-determination. This 
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limitation also has a chilling effect on their associations with their 
neighbors,175 and it makes associations with those outside of their 
neighborhood, particularly those who are of other races, very 
difficult.176 In addition, the fact that some poor people of color feel the 
need to look less “ethnic” in order to avoid being a target for constant 
monitoring, because of racial and socioeconomic biases,177 shows that 
the war on crime has led some to severely limit their sense of self-
expression out of desire to keep some of their privacy. This fact is 
significant because how one dresses and how one wears one’s hair are 
important expressions of one’s personal and cultural identity.178 
Freedom of association and expression are important aspects of self-
development because they allow for the free exchange of ideas and 
experimentation with one’s identity. These freedoms also enable 
minority viewpoints and cultural identities to become part of 
mainstream political discourse. In addition, it has been documented 
that residential racial segregation limits the access that people of color 
have to the types of informal social networks that increase the 
likelihood of upward mobility.179 
These stops are also problematic because this constant barrage of 
questioning regarding one’s activities and comings and goings 
expresses the lack of trust that the state has for poor people of color. It 
does not matter that innocent individuals do not have anything to 
hide,180 this lack of trust shows a suspicion that these individuals need 
to be constantly watched in order to keep them in line. The fact that 
this sentiment is often expressed in a public setting intensifies the 
insult to their dignity because these individuals must bear the shame 
that others might assume that the stops confirm that poor people of 
color must always be watched. Furthermore, the fact that white and 
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wealthier individuals do not have to endure these stops with the 
frequency that poor people of color do expresses that whites and 
wealthier individuals are worthy of more privacy, and, therefore, more 
trust and respect. 
This indignity is further heightened by the fact that most individuals 
do not feel free to speak out against these stops-and-frisks.181 Refusal 
of consent to a search or speech against an officer’s actions could 
potentially result in retaliation in the form of a resisting arrest charge, 
physical violence, or future harassment.182 For this reason, most 
individuals opt to endure this treatment in silence. Silence, however, 
can often make one feel complicit in his subordination.183 In other 
words, it can make one feel like he is agreeing with the state that it has 
to monitor his constant movements. This feeling leads to further 
feelings of shame, anger, and resentment, particularly if one is being 
dressed down in front of others, including one’s children. 
In addition, the fact that the state does not appear to be concerned 
about the chilling effect that these privacy invasions have on self-
determination, self-expression, and freedom of association suggests 
that minority viewpoints and identities are less worthy of recognition. 
For example, criminal justice policies that discourage an African-
American woman from wearing her hair in braids or clothing that is 
viewed as stereotypically “black,” because the state actors following 
those policies tend to focus on women who choose to express 
themselves in these ways, send the message that “ethnic” identities are 
undesirable.184 Furthermore, if these practices discourage her from 
venturing beyond her neighborhood or even her home, the state is 
expressing that she “belongs” in the poor, segregated neighborhood 
where she resides and nowhere else. 
There is also a strange paradox that is occurring surrounding the 
home. Both rhetorically and constitutionally speaking, the home has 
been particularly revered as a place where one is entitled to the utmost 
privacy.185 Even during the era of Prohibition, the law gave homes 
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special protection.186 In fact, the Volstead Act only covered alcohol 
sales in the home, not alcohol served to guests or kept for personal 
consumption.187 Furthermore, the Act imposed criminal sanctions 
against any law enforcement officer who conducted unlawful searches 
in the home.188 
On the one hand, stops-and-frisks on the street do not infringe upon 
the privacy that one enjoys in one’s home. Indeed, it seems that some 
poor people of color are retreating and staying in their homes in order 
to have some semblance of privacy.189 Yet because some anonymity in 
public space is essential for a greater amount of freedom of self-
determination, self-expression, and freedom of association, privacy 
solely in the home is inadequate to fully engage in these freedoms. 
Stops-and-frisks, however, do not even give poor people of color 
unfettered access to privacy in their homes. It is quite significant that 
many inner-city residents, particularly those who live in public 
housing, must endure stops-and-frisks and general police harassment 
right outside of their homes or within the hallways of their apartment 
buildings.190 Given the significance that the home has in our culture, it 
is downright demoralizing that poor individuals of color have to carry 
identification or mail to prove that they actually live where they claim 
that they live or have to carry a pay stub to prove that they make 
money in a legitimate way.191 Even though the home arguably can 
provide a respite from the state’s eyes, some individuals first have to 
let the state take a quick peek into their lives in order to prove that 
they have a right to gain access to the threshold of that respite. 
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2. Technology and Data Aggregation 
Another troubling aspect of the war on crime is the practice of data 
collection through technology. One example of this is the creation of 
gang databases throughout the country. Not only do the police subject 
young African-American and Latino males to constant stops-and-frisks 
and harassment, but they also often use these stops to gather 
information about them to put into a database.192 This information can 
include monikers, tattoos, names of associates, schools attended, home 
addresses, and photographs.193 While the police are purportedly 
recording the information of only suspected gang members, the criteria 
for determining membership or association with a gang is highly 
subjective and often based on racial and ethnic stereotypes regarding 
the clothing, tattoos, and music choices believed to be associated with 
gangs.194 For example, in Denver, a young person can get entered into 
the database by displaying any two of a list of attributes, which include, 
“slang, ‘clothing of a particular color,’ pagers, hairstyles, or jewelry.”195 
It was revealed in November 1993 that Denver had compiled a list of 
6,500 “suspected” gang members.196 Though African-Americans 
accounted for less than 5% of Denver’s population, they accounted for 
57% of those on the list.197 What is most stunning is that well over two-
thirds of all African-American youths and young men between the ages 
of twelve and twenty who lived in Denver were on the list.198 Latinos 
accounted for another one-third of the list; whites, who represented 
80% of Denver’s population, only accounted for fewer than 7% on the 
list.199 In Los Angeles, mass stops of African-American males led to the 
creation of a database that had their names, addresses, and other 
biographical information.200 This practice was so prevalent that the 
database contained information on nearly half of all young, African-
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American males in the city.201 Similar lists, which disproportionately 
affect young men of color, are kept in cities across the country.202 
Furthermore, because state and local agencies often do not update 
these databases on a regular basis, once an individual is documented, 
his information tends to stay in a database indefinitely.203 Many 
individuals do not even know that they are in these databases because 
the government is under no obligation to inform them of this fact.204 
Another potentially invasive and troubling form of data collection 
and aggregation is the use of geolocation and social networking 
technology. In 2011, law enforcement agencies in the United States 
made more than 1.3 million requests to wireless carriers for their 
subscribers’ information.205 Between January and June 2013, they 
made 10,918 requests for information from Google and YouTube.206 
Google reports that there is a trend of increasing government 
surveillance of its sites.207 In the first half of 2012, Twitter received 
679 user information requests.208 This was more requests than Twitter 
received during the entirety of 2011.209 
It is unclear whether the police legally must obtain a warrant in 
order to obtain online communications and geolocation data,210 but 
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many agencies habitually make warrantless requests for this 
information.211 Some police departments have even invested in their 
own cell tracking technology.212 There are also cases where the police 
have used a person’s Facebook friends to obtain access to that 
individual’s personal page, comments, and list of friends.213 
Furthermore, a few cities have begun using the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Lighthouse, a computer program that analyzes geographical 
and social relationships.214 
A few police departments also are considering the use of 
surveillance drones,215 but it is no secret that many cities and towns in 
the United States already engage in mass surveillance of public spaces 
using both private and public video cameras.216 As part of former 
Mayor Giuliani’s war on crime, cameras were placed in “Central Park, 
subway stations, and numerous ‘high crime’ public housing 
projects.”217 Since that time, the number of cameras has increased to 
such a degree that anyone who is in a public space in lower Manhattan 
right now is likely being watched.218 The same is true with respect to 
Times Square.219 The most recent surveillance system in New York 
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City is the Domain Awareness System, which “aggregates and analyzes 
information from approximately 3,000 surveillance cameras around 
the city and allows the police to scan license plates, cross-check 
criminal databases, measure radiation levels, and more.”220 In 
Washington, D.C. the police have plans to consolidate all cameras 
owned by city agencies, including the public school system, the public 
housing system, and the parks system.221 This consolidation is 
estimated to include more than 5,200 cameras.222 Chicago’s system 
involves 2,250 cameras, 250 of which have biometric technology.223 
Many cameras in these jurisdictions have face recognition software.224 
In addition, local law enforcement, state crime labs, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation have created DNA databases of potential 
suspects. This practice will probably be on the rise given the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Maryland v. King, which held that it is 
constitutional to collect a DNA swab from a person who is arrested for 
a serious offense.225 State and national databases are regulated and 
typically require a conviction or arrest before someone’s DNA can be 
collected.226 Local agencies, however, have taken a broader approach. 
Some agencies collect the DNA of innocent victims without telling 
them that the samples will be saved for future searches.227 Some collect 
samples from low-level offenders in exchange for plea bargains or in 
exchange for having charges dropped against them.228 Some agencies 
are taking samples “on the mere suspicion of a crime, long before an 
arrest, and holding on to it regardless of the outcome. Often detectives 
get DNA samples simply by asking suspects for them.”229 Some 
secretly collect DNA from discarded trash.230 
Further research is needed to explore how pervasive data collection 
through geolocation technology and social networks is with respect to 
the war on crime and whether there are disproportionate effects on 
communities of color.231 Mass surveillance through video cameras 
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obviously involves citizens other than just poor people of color, 
although the focus on public housing sites and “high crime” areas in 
some neighborhoods potentially could have disproportionate effects 
on poor people of color. Similarly, because poor people of color suffer 
disproportionate arrest and stop-and-frisk rates,232 they potentially are 
more vulnerable to DNA collection. With respect to those jurisdictions 
that collect DNA from victims, poor people of color are also 
vulnerable given the fact that they disproportionately are the victims 
of violent crime.233 
Not only are gang databases problematic because they sometimes 
lead to inaccurate data,234 but they are also problematic because they 
potentially discourage young African-American and Latino males from 
spending much time outside of the home out of the fear that the state 
will collect personal information about them, which could then lead to 
them being targeted for further surveillance. This chilling effect limits 
their mobility and the creation of their life plans. It also means that 
their abilities to create robust social capital and to be part of 
mainstream political discourse are also limited. Gang databases also 
discourage poor men of color from dressing and speaking as they see 
fit, since part of the criteria for determining whether someone belongs 
in the database is how an individual dresses and whether they use 
slang.235 How one dresses and speaks is an important aspect of self-
identity and expression. In addition, gang databases potentially 
discourage poor young men of color from associating with one 
another out of a fear of guilt by association, which heightens one’s 
vulnerability to further surveillance. These types of friendships can be 
critical to a young man’s development, self-esteem, and general well-
being. Furthermore, the fact that gang databases focus mainly on 
African-American males expresses that these individuals must be 
constantly monitored; they are not worthy of respect and their 
viewpoints and identities must be managed and cabined. 
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Data aggregation through geolocation technology and social 
networking sites is also problematic. Cell phones have become a 
necessity in our society. Indeed, many people, particularly poor 
people, do not even own landlines in their homes anymore.236 If 
people have to worry about the tracking of their comings and goings 
through their cell phones, geolocation technology could have a 
chilling effect on their mobility and creation of life plans. In addition, 
it could affect their freedom of expression and association if 
individuals have to worry about the state having easy access to the 
names of whom they are calling. This aggregation of data could also 
have a chilling effect on discussions and connections made via social 
media sites. Similar chilling effects on self-determination, freedom of 
association, and freedom of expression are also implicated with 
respect to mass surveillance given the fact that more and more public 
spaces are being tracked twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week.237 
Some may think it alarmist to consider whether the aggregation of 
data through technology will really have such a chilling effect, 
especially for innocent individuals who have nothing to hide or for 
those who do not even know that the data collection is happening. 
The problem is that even innocent conduct can sometimes be 
embarrassing or simply politically unpopular. This type of information 
could potentially affect one’s job prospects, housing opportunities, and 
social relationships if made public. Furthermore, the volume of 
information that the state can gather through technology is much 
greater than traditional police surveillance techniques. For these 
reasons, some anonymity from the state via technology is essential in 
order to prevent this type of information from providing opportunities 
for state abuse. We should be particularly troubled by the potential 
chilling effect that law enforcement practices could have on social 
media activity given the fact that it has been shown to be an important 
catalyst for political expression and change. Data aggregation also 
expresses that the state distrusts that targeted individuals are engaged 
in legitimate activity. 
Finally, although the DNA samples collected for criminal databases 
currently only provide information about the identification of a 
particular individual, and not his genetic traits, technology could 
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advance in the future to allow for this type of determination.238 The 
state’s access to this type of medical information could allow for wide-
ranging abuse, including discrimination in housing, employment, and 
health benefits. 
3. SWAT and No-Knock Entries 
The militarization of law enforcement also has led to less respect for 
individual privacy, which is most evident in the increased use of 
paramilitary police units, most commonly known as Special Weapons 
and Tactics (“SWAT”) units.239 Prior to the war on drugs, SWAT 
teams were primarily used during highly volatile situations such as 
bank robberies or hostage situations.240 Now, however, SWAT teams 
are used for routine drug arrests.241 In some jurisdictions, drug 
warrants are only served by SWAT teams.242 
Under the common law, the police were required to announce 
themselves before breaking in the doors of someone’s home.243 The 
Supreme Court has held that the “knock and announce” rule is part of 
the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.244 One of 
the purposes of this rule is to protect “those elements of privacy and 
dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance” by the police.245 In 
other words, a knock and announce allows a home’s occupants to 
gather and present themselves in a modest manner.246 If it is in the 
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middle of the night, a knock and announce allows a person to get out 
of bed and put on some clothes before the police enter.247 
The Court has made it clear, however, that a knock and announce is 
not always required by the Fourth Amendment.248 Examples of 
situations when this rule may not apply include when there is a risk 
that an arrestee may escape, when there is a risk of violence, or when 
there is a risk that an arrestee might destroy evidence.249 In addition, 
the police are free to apply for a no-knock warrant before making an 
arrest.250 The Court requires, however, that the determination as to 
whether the knock and announce rule applies must be made on a case-
by-case basis.251 In other words, the police or a magistrate cannot 
determine that a knock and announce is not necessary simply because 
the case involves a drug crime.252 Nevertheless, judges in many states 
routinely approve no-knock warrants in drug cases,253 and the police 
often execute drug warrants without announcing themselves.254 This 
practice is bolstered by the fact that the Supreme Court has held that 
the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock and 
announce requirement.255 For this reason, even if a court determines 
that the police should have knocked and announced themselves before 
entering someone’s home, any evidence they seized during an 
otherwise legal search can still be used against a defendant.256 
Yet, even when a court determines that a knock and announce is 
required, the time required between the announcement and entry is 
quite small. Police typically wait no more than ten or fifteen seconds 
before entering a person’s home.257 In United States v. Banks, the 
Supreme Court determined that fifteen to twenty seconds after a 
knock and announce was potentially enough time for the defendant to 
dispose of cocaine, and therefore, the police’s entry within that time 
period was reasonable.258 This small amount of time clearly does not 
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give individuals much of a chance to prepare for a police entry, 
especially if they are fast asleep at night. Regardless of this fact, the 
police use surprise home entries regularly to arrest low-level drug 
suspects, including those who possess small amounts of marijuana.259 
What is most troubling about the militarization of drug arrests and 
searches, however, is the attitude that it creates among police officers. 
The U.S. military routinely conducts training operations with civilian 
police departments.260 The indoctrination of military ethos into law 
enforcement makes it so that, with respect to drug crimes, the job of 
the police is no longer to serve and to protect; instead, their job is to 
destroy the enemy.261 Descriptions of the types of slogans on the t-
shirts that officers wear at SWAT conventions and competitions across 
the country are telling. “We don’t do drive-by shootings. We stop.” 
and “Operation: Ghetto Storm” are just a couple of examples.262 
The tactics that these SWAT units use are similar across 
jurisdictions. To seize upon the element of surprise, the police often 
wait until late at night or just before dawn to conduct an arrest or 
search.263 Often dressed in black, and armed with their assault 
weapons and sometimes a no-knock warrant, they break down an 
individual’s front door.264 They sometimes use diversionary devices 
like flash bang grenades that cause temporary blindness and 
deafness.265 Awaking in a stupor, the suspect and his family are pelted 
with screaming and guns in their faces.266 If they are lucky, they are in 
their pajamas. But it is also quite likely that they are wearing very little 
or no clothing.267 There also are likely to be children around, 
frightened by the commotion.268 Some home occupants, sleepy and 
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confused about what is happening, get in defensive mode and pull out 
their own weapons because they mistake the police for illegal 
intruders.269 As a result, these raids sometimes lead to deaths.270 Even 
barking pets have been killed during some of these raids.271 The risk of 
violence created by these surprise entries might be legitimate for the 
capture of violent offenders, but the vast majority of these arrests are 
conducted on low-level drug offenders with no history of violence.272 
As already discussed, the home has traditionally been revered as the 
one place where one’s privacy should be respected.273 SWAT invasions, 
however, are the epitome of a lack of respect of one’s privacy in the 
home. Not only are these surprise attacks on mostly nonviolent, and 
often innocent, individuals frightening and dangerous, but they also 
deprive residents of the opportunity for modesty and a space for 
intimate interactions in their homes. These violations are the highest 
form of disrespect because they express that the state has so much 
distrust for the individual, it has circumvented the norm of heightened 
privacy in the home. Furthermore, if a person cannot engage in self-
determination, self-expression, and freedom of association in one’s 
home, it is hard to imagine where one can engage in such activity. For 
this reason, the potential chilling effect of military type invasions of 
one’s home could be quite devastating. 
4. Snitching 
Another weapon in the war on crime arsenal is the snitch. It is 
important to differentiate snitches from law-abiding citizens who 
report crime in their communities. A snitch is someone who engages 
in crime and then reports criminal activity to the government in order 
to obtain lesser punishment or no punishment at all.274 A reduction in 
sentencing is particularly enticing for drug defendants because federal 
drug charges involve severe mandatory minimum sentences that can 
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only be reduced by cooperating with the government.275 The U.S. 
Sentencing Commission estimates that snitches provided information 
in 40% of drug cases that resulted in sentences of ten years or more.276 
Snitches also sometimes receive cash.277 Indeed, forfeiture statutes 
authorize paying informants a percentage of the value of assets seized 
as the result of their tips.278 Non-U.S. citizens can sometimes obtain 
visas in exchange for cooperation with the government.279 There are 
even “professional” snitches who seek out drug users and dealers in 
order to provide tips to the police for cash or even drugs.280 
Often, however, the government recruits snitches. The police might 
engage in an “informed bluff” where they do not have enough 
evidence to indict an individual, but they are still able to use the 
evidence that they do have to scare that person into cooperating.281 
The police also sometimes engage in illegal behavior in order to 
recruit a snitch.282 They will target a particular individual and wait 
until he is suspected of possessing illegal contraband.283 The police 
then “arrest” the individual based on what is usually an illegal search 
or seizure.284 Fearful of going to jail, the individual agrees to 
cooperate.285 In local and state systems, the deal may be either oral or 
written; the Federal Bureau of Investigation requires that all informant 
agreements be in writing.286 An informant may help out with one 
particular case or with several cases; the state may also use him to 
“[keep] feelers” out in a particular community.287 Snitches put back on 
the street often are permitted to continue to commit serious crimes 
with impunity.288 A disturbing trend involves the recruitment of 
teenagers as criminal informants, which “often involves risks that are 
incommensurate with the charges that they are facing.”289 Indeed, 
 
 275 See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 29. 
 276 BUTLER, supra note 4, at 82. 
 277 See BUTLER, supra note 4, at 84; NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 27. 
 278 See sources cited supra note 277. 
 279 See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 29. 
 280 See BALKO, supra note 239, at 3; NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 15, 28.  
 281 See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 18. 
 282 See id. 
 283 See id. 
 284 Id. at 18-19. 
 285 See id. at 19. 
 286 See id. 
 287 See id. at 20. 
 288 See BUTLER, supra note 4, at 93; NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 16.  
 289 Sarah Stillman, The Throwaways, NEW YORKER 1, 2 (Sept. 3, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/09/03/120903fa_fact_stillman. 
  
2014] Watching Me 1577 
because they lack training, experience, and maturity, the use of these 
children, sometimes as young as fourteen or fifteen, often has led to 
their brutal deaths.290 
Sometimes prosecutors will incentivize an individual to become a 
snitch by agreeing to lessen or drop criminal charges against a family 
member.291 Or, if a family member has better access to information 
that a prosecutor wants, the prosecutor might allow the family 
member to act as the snitch in order to work off the individual’s 
charges.292 
Because drug arrests disproportionately affect African-Americans 
and Latinos, there are a disproportionate number of snitches in their 
neighborhoods as “criminal offenders actively [seek] information in 
order to ‘work off’ their own charges.”293 In addition, the use of 
teenage snitches disproportionately occurs in poor African-American 
and Latino communities.294 One study found that African-American 
and Latino neighborhoods were disproportionately the target of bad 
search warrants in San Diego, 80% of which relied upon snitches.295 
Many bad searches are in the form of intrusive SWAT and no-knock 
entries.296 The reasons that snitches have become such a powerful tool, 
however, is because of the prevalent practice of overcharging. As will 
be discussed in the next section, overcharging allows prosecutors to 
scare suspects into cooperating through snitching in order to avoid 
hefty sentences.297 
The use of snitching instills the realistic fear that one’s neighbors, 
family members, or friends might be spying on him. Snitching, 
therefore, potentially chills freedom of expression and association 
because individuals do not know whom they can trust with knowledge 
about their thoughts, feelings, and conduct. Anything they say or do 
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might later be used against them by the state. Indeed, snitches increase 
the access that the state has to an individual’s private information 
because they supplement the limited resources the state typically has 
to monitor its citizens. The harms caused by snitching are heightened 
by the fact that a snitch might be a family member.298 Snitching is 
another way that poor people of color feel mistrust and suspicion from 
the government. Furthermore, creating an atmosphere where 
individuals mistrust members of their own household expresses 
complete contempt for the privacy of poor people of color, since 
privacy in the home is supposed to be highly valued. 
5. Overcharging and Harsh Sentences 
One of the most startling results of the war on crime is the 
exponential growth in arrest and incarceration rates, especially of 
African-Americans.299 In fact, “[i]f jail inmates are included, per capita 
black incarceration is 80 percent higher than the rate at which Stalin’s 
regime banished its subjects to the Gulag’s many camps.”300 Nearly 
60% of all incarcerated drug offenders are African-American, and 
African-Americans and Latinos comprise nearly 75% of drug offenders 
in state prisons.301 In many major cities as many as 80% of young 
African-American men have criminal records.302 As a result, the vast 
majority of individuals of color in poor urban neighborhoods have 
family members who are a part of the criminal justice system, either as 
prisoners or parolees.303 
While the war on drugs is one cause of the increase in arrest and 
imprisonment rates, the chief cause is an increase in the number of 
individuals charged and convicted of crimes.304 A common practice is 
to charge an individual with as many crimes as possible in order to 
nudge, or even coerce, a defendant into a plea agreement.305 The more 
charges levied against a defendant, the higher his potential sentence 
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is.306 Moreover, harsh sentences that are attached to certain crimes 
because of mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws also create an 
incentive for a defendant to plea bargain.307 When prosecutors file 
these charges, they know full well that they do not desire to convict 
these defendants with the vast majority of these crimes nor do they 
seek such high levels of punishment.308 If a defendant believes that he 
could be subject to death or a long prison sentence, however, he will 
often be more willing to plead guilty to the crime and sentence that is 
the actual goal of the prosecutor.309 This practice of overcharging to 
induce guilty pleas is aided by the fact that, as part of the political war 
on crime over the last few decades,310 state and federal legislators have 
both increased the number of crimes on the books and broadened the 
liability of criminal defendants under various crimes that already 
existed.311 First, they have increased the number of overlapping 
crimes, which enable a prosecutor to charge a defendant with multiple 
crimes for the same conduct.312 In addition, they have redefined 
criminal offenses in such a way that less serious conduct is 
criminalized more severely now than it was in the past.313 As a result, 
the guilty plea rate in felony cases is now 96%.314 
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Overcharging and harsh sentencing make inner-city residents more 
vulnerable to privacy invasions. They have exponentially increased the 
number of individuals who are labeled as “criminal,” including 
innocent people convicted based on pressured plea deals.315 Once a 
person has this stigma, the police feel even more entitled to engage in 
stops-and-frisks, motor stops, data collection, SWAT invasions, and 
perpetual surveillance and harassment of him.316 Harsh sentencing and 
overcharging also encourage snitching, which, as already has been 




Each of the tactics I have described in this Part is troubling in its 
own right. Yet, many individuals, particularly poor, young urban 
males of color, endure many of them simultaneously. They endure 
constant stops-and-frisks, which could potentially lead to their 
personal information being placed in a gang database. They might also 
have to provide a DNA swab in order to terminate their encounters 
with the police. Law enforcement might track them further through 
their cell phones and social networking pages. Due to oppressive 
overcharging policies regarding minor offenses, they are in more 
danger of being convicted of crimes, which also leads to heightened 
surveillance. Even if a young man of color avoids a conviction, he still 
has to worry about a close friend or neighbor snitching on him so that 
he might avoid his own potentially hefty sentence. As already 
described, the aggregation of these forms of monitoring by the state 
have the potential for substantial chilling effects on activities we 
typically value in our democratic society, and they also create serious 
dignitary harms. 
III. IN SEARCH OF A BETTER APPROACH 
Thus far this Article has critiqued the privacy invasions experienced 
under the war on crime on moral grounds. In this Part, I will further 
argue that they cannot even be supported on utilitarian grounds. It 
cannot be denied that crime is a serious problem in poor urban 
communities of color. Indeed, the level of violence in these 
communities is staggering and disturbing. In 2006, the murder rate for 
whites was 3 per 100,000; for African-Americans, it was 24.317 
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Furthermore, although I am critiquing the war on crime, I certainly do 
still believe that the state, and law enforcement in particular, has an 
important role in reducing the level of violence in these communities. 
Many poor people of color share this sentiment particularly because 
their victimization has historically been ignored by the police.318 
According to liberal theorists, the state may limit an individual’s 
rights to the extent that those rights infringe upon the rights or 
security of other members of society.319 If one’s privacy threatens a 
community to an excessive degree, therefore, liberal principles suggest 
that it is acceptable for the state to curb that privacy. One might argue 
that a decrease in crime, and particularly in violence, is worth some 
loss of individual privacy.320 Furthermore, while criminal justice 
policies disproportionately affect poor urban people of color, the fact 
is that they are the ones who are the most victimized by violent 
crime.321 For these reasons, theoretically, these individuals should be 
willing to experience less privacy than their middle-class and white 
counterparts, if this loss means that their streets can be safer.322 
The problem with this line of argument in this context, however, is 
that many of the tactics discussed in this Article severely violate 
individual privacy rights,323 but many do not appear to be all that 
effective in combatting crime.324 It has been documented that the high 
number of street and traffic stops conducted by law enforcement 
across the country yield low results. Eighty-five percent of 
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documented stops-and-frisks conducted in New York are on African-
Americans and Latinos.325 Yet, the police confiscate weapons and 
contraband in only 1.14% of these stops.326 Furthermore, it is 
estimated that 95% of motor stops conducted through Operation 
Pipeline stops yield no illegal drugs.327 One study found that up to 
99% of traffic stops result in no citation; 98% of searches were based 
on the consent of the driver with no other legal justification for the 
search.328 Moreover, data consistently show that the success rates for 
finding contraband during the stops-and-frisks of whites are higher 
than those for stops-and-frisks of African-Americans.329 In other 
words, the disproportionate number of stops-and-frisks of African-
Americans is inefficient. The inefficiency of these stops is not 
surprising given the subjective and contradictory drug courier profiles 
that law enforcement officers use in determining whom to search: 
The profile can include . . . driving an expensive car, driving a 
car that needs repairs, driving with out-of-state license plates, 
driving a rental car, driving with “mismatched occupants” 
acting too calm, acting too nervous, dressing casually, [and] 
wearing expensive clothing or jewelry . . . .330 
On the Los Angeles Police Department’s website, it is noted that 
wearing the color green can mean either that the “gang member” is 
declaring neutrality for the moment or is a drug dealer.331 As a result 
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of these broad criteria, the police really have an excuse to stop anyone 
they please, including those who fit certain racial or ethnic 
stereotypes.332 
The fact that gang databases are also based on highly subjective 
criteria, including racial and ethnic stereotypes,333 suggests that they 
also are probably unreliable. Furthermore, some of the information 
that is collected in the databases is based on self-reporting, which is 
also unreliable because poor urban youths often claim to be a member 
of a gang in order to protect themselves or to make themselves seem 
tougher and more important.334 As already mentioned, these databases 
are rarely updated,335 which also increases their unreliability. For these 
reasons, studies have shown that gang databases tend to be of little 
value.336 
With respect to snitching, one of the chief criticisms of this practice 
is that snitches are often unreliable.337 A person who is facing a hefty 
jail sentence may be more than willing to point his finger in another 
direction in order to reduce his own sentence.338 Moreover, a person 
with few material resources or a serious drug habit is also willing to 
give the police a few names in order to score some extra cash or 
drugs.339 Lying snitches lead to mistaken SWAT invasions, which 
sometimes end in death.340 They also lead to the conviction of the 
innocent, either because juries believe their false stories or because 
innocent defendants plead guilty because they fear that the jury will 
believe the false stories.341 Studies show that twenty-one to 50% of 
wrongful capital convictions were based on false informant 
testimony.342 
Furthermore, because the drug war in particular is a numbers game, 
the best snitches often are the most dangerous actors at the highest 
level of a drug operation, not the lowest level and least violent 
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actors.343 These individuals tend to have the most information in terms 
of how a particular drug ring operates, who is involved in that drug 
ring, and who the drug users are.344 As a result, they are able to give 
the police a higher number of names than those at the lower end of 
the totem pole.345 Moreover, asset forfeiture provisions favor the big 
kingpins who can essentially buy their freedom by offering a share of 
drug profits in exchange for leniency.346 This is the reason that low 
level, nonviolent drug offenders and drug users tend to go to jail and 
not the violent kingpins.347 Indeed, 80% of drug arrests are for 
possession, not for sales, and 80% of the growth of drug arrests in the 
1990s was for marijuana possession.348 Focusing on nonviolent users 
of marijuana surely will not curb the violence in inner cities, which is 
purportedly one of the aims of the war on drugs. 
One might argue that getting any drug dealer off of the street, no 
matter his level in a drug organization, makes neighborhoods safer. 
Yet, the reality is that when one dealer goes to jail, he makes room for 
the next dealer to take his place.349 In addition, when law enforcement 
breaks up one drug ring, the market in a particular neighborhood 
destabilizes, which leads to turf wars and increased violence.350 As a 
result, scholars scathingly note that we now have a criminal justice 
system of high quantity with low quality.351 In other words, 
overcharging and harsh sentencing have led to higher arrest and 
imprisonment rates, but this increase has not led to a proportionate 
decrease in violent crime.352 
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Respecting individual privacy, however, could actually help make 
the criminal justice system become more effective in combatting 
crime. Social science research suggests that individuals are more apt to 
follow the law and to respect law enforcement officers when they feel 
that they have been treated fairly and respectfully.353 For this reason, if 
the state begins to acknowledge the personhood of residents in poor, 
urban communities of color by decreasing the overwhelming feeling of 
being constantly watched, these residents could become more law 
abiding. They also could become more cooperative in helping the 
police target those individuals who actually are posing the most 
danger to the community.354 Furthermore, if individuals no longer feel 
like the state is “occupy[ing] and preoccupy[ing]”355 their 
neighborhoods through oppressive surveillance, they will have more 
freedom of expression and association. This greater freedom will 
encourage strong friendships and networks within the community, 
which are also characteristic of neighborhoods with reduced rates of 
crime and violence.356 For these reasons, criminal justice policies that 
enhance privacy can lead to a more positive and effective dynamic 
between the state and the individuals in these communities; this type 
of dynamic could ultimately lead to a more effective criminal justice 
system. 
One could argue that it is the violence in these neighborhoods, and 
not the criminal justice tactics discussed in this Article, that is 
undermining the creation of informal social networks in these 
neighborhoods. If one is afraid she is going to be shot, that fear will 
certainly inhibit her willingness to leave her home and socialize with 
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her neighbors. Obviously more than access to privacy is needed to 
address violent crime. Yet as has already been discussed, many policies 
that deprive individuals of privacy do not seem that effective in 
curbing violence. Since privacy is an important tool in fostering the 
types of informal networks that are present in neighborhoods with low 
crime rates, these policies instead appear to be counterproductive. 
It cannot be denied that there is a dark side to privacy, however. 
While privacy allows access to greater freedoms, it also can be a means 
for hiding oppression. Indeed, radical feminists have argued that we 
should “explode the private,” because privacy historically was used as 
a shield for batterers and rapists from state intervention.357 Bennett 
Capers has argued that cameras in public spaces have the potential of 
deterring crime, unveiling police brutality and racial profiling, and 
preventing wrongful convictions.358 DNA databases also have the 
potential of preventing wrongful convictions.359 These arguments are 
particularly compelling given the fact that crime in poor communities 
of color is often under-enforced360 and that there are high numbers of 
individuals who are wrongfully convicted.361 
I am not advocating, therefore, for a wholesale removal of video 
surveillance, DNA databases, and any of the other tactics discussed in 
this Article. Instead, I want to highlight the privacy invasions that 
extreme forms of these tactics create and the role that these invasions 
play in the state’s subordination of its citizens. These harms should be 
balanced against their law enforcement value. A complete analysis of 
this balancing is beyond the scope of this Article,362 but given the 
importance of privacy, these harms should be taken quite seriously 
and not simply dismissed in the name of crime prevention. 
Some legal actors have already begun taking steps to restore the 
dignity and privacy of citizens disproportionately affected by the war 
on crime. In the Bronx, the district attorney’s office no longer 
prosecutes residents of housing projects who were arrested for 
trespassing unless an attorney from the office first determines that 
there is a legitimate basis for pressing charges, based on an interview 
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with the police officer who made the initial arrest.363 If adopted by 
other jurisdictions, this type of practice ideally will limit the amount 
of harassment these residents must endure to prove that they have a 
right to be in and around their own homes. Furthermore, a Brooklyn 
judge recently declared that he will dismiss any public intoxication 
case brought before him unless the police officer who made the arrest 
can prove, in a manner other than by a sniff, that the open container 
actually contained alcohol.364 Concerned that the city’s public drinking 
law is being disproportionately enforced against African-Americans 
and Latinos, Judge Noach Dear hoped that his ruling would encourage 
the New York Police Department to “reconsider its enforcement of the 
ordinance.”365 If more judges took similar types of actions, the police 
would have less incentive to harass residents with frequent Terry, and 
even illegal, stops in the hopes of adding to their tallies of arrests. 
The “it takes a lot of frogs”366 mentality must cease. Criminal justice 
success needs to be measured in ways other than high arrest and 
prosecution rates.367 When the police and prosecutors focus so much 
on numbers, privacy goes to the wayside. Law enforcement agencies 
need to find innovative policies that actually reduce violence and 
crime, but that do not undermine individual privacy. For example, 
assigning specific police officers to public housing sites on a 
permanent basis, so that they can really get to know residents in a 
personal way, could be a better practice in combatting crime than the 
common practice of simply harassing every person who attempts to 
enter a building. It is time to create policies that incentivize high 
quality, not high quantity criminal justice where police officers must 
articulate more concrete reasons for their privacy invasions than just 
“furtive movement” or minor violations.368 Furthermore, police 
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officers need to become more conscious of the implicit racial biases 
that we all share369 during their interactions with poor citizens of 
color.370 
Although this Article focuses on the aggregate effect of the war on 
crime on poor people of color, all citizens should be concerned about 
this phenomenon not just as a matter of racial and socioeconomic 
justice, but also because the tactics I discuss are a potential threat to 
everyone. Indeed, poor people of color appear to be the canary in the 
mine. Surely some, if not most, of the 1.3 million wireless services 
subscribers whom the police targeted in 2011 were neither poor nor of 
color. In addition, “although whites are underrepresented as drug 
offenders, the percentage of offenders who are white has risen since 
1999, and the percentage of offenders who are African-American has 
declined.”371 There are a rising number of whites who are serving 
mandatory sentences for methamphetamine abuse.372 In addition, the 
practice of overcharging and harsh sentencing is not limited to the war 
on drugs. Prosecutions of all crimes, including those with offenders 
who are mostly white, have increased as part of the war on crime.373 
Specifically, offenders of sexually explicit material offenses tend to be 
middle-aged white men; these prosecutions have risen by more than 
400% since 1996.374 Finally, everyone is a potential target of mass 
surveillance and DNA databases. 
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CONCLUSION 
The war on crime has a racialized history, and scholars have 
documented the various ways that it has had subordinating effects on 
poor urban people of color.375 This Article contributes to this account 
by arguing that privacy makes one less vulnerable to oppressive state 
subordination and social control. In the aggregate, the privacy 
invasions caused by stops-and-frisks, motor stops, SWAT invasions, 
snitching, and data aggregation through technology inhibit self-
determination, self-expression, and freedom of association. 
Overcharging and harsh sentencing make individuals even more 
vulnerable to these privacy invasions. As a result, poor people of color 
are obstructed in the creation of life plans, are left out of mainstream 
political discourse, and have limited access to social capital. These 
tactics also send the message that poor people of color cannot be 
trusted to engage in legitimate activities and that the state disrespects 
them and values their identities and viewpoints less than those of 
white and wealthier individuals. Both of these messages result in 
dignitary harms. 
While these tactics purport to combat crime, they entail privacy 
invasions that discourage law-abiding behavior and stymy the creation 
of the strong relationships and networks that are characteristic of 
neighborhoods with low crime rates. For these reasons, the criminal 
justice system’s assault on poor people of color’s privacy simply 
cannot be justified. Furthermore, poor people of color are the canary 
in the mine. Whites are now also experiencing serious privacy 
invasions. For this reason, everyone has a stake in this matter because 
these policies have deep implications for how the line ultimately will 
be drawn between all individuals and the state in the criminal justice 
context and beyond.  
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